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5Foreword
The requirements for measurement, reporting and verification (MRV) of nationally appropriate mitigation actions 
(NAMAs) are one of the crucial topics on the agenda of international negotiations to address climate change 
mitigation. According to agreements so far, the general guidelines for domestic MRV are to be developed by 
Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA)1. Further, the Subsidiary Body for Implementation 
(SBI) will be conducting international consultations and analysis (ICA) of biennial update reports (BUR) to improve 
transparency of mitigation actions, which should be measured, reported and verified2. 
What is clear from undergoing discussions both at SBSTA and at SBI is that MRV for NAMAs should not be a 
burden for controlling greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions connected to economic activities. Instead, the MRV pro-
cess should facilitate mitigation actions; encourage the redirection of investments and address concerns regarding 
carbon content of emission intensive operations of private and public companies and enterprises worldwide. 
While MRV requirements are being shaped within the Convention, there are a number of initiatives supporting de-
veloping countries moving forward with NAMA development and demonstration activities. How these actions shall 
be measured, reported and verified, however, remain unanswered.
MRV is not new. It is present in most existing policies and frameworks related to climate change mitigation. With 
an aim to contribute to international debate and capacity building on this crucial issue, the UNEP Risø Centre in 
cooperation with UNDP, are pleased to present this publication that through the direct collaboration with Det Nor-
ske Veritas (DNV) builds on existing MRV practices in current carbon markets; provides insights on how MRV for 
NAMAs can be performed and identifies elements and drivers to be considered when designing adequate MRV 
systems for NAMAs in developing countries.
This primer is the second contribution in the emerging area of NAMAs and MRV. It is complemented by a recent 
publication on Low Carbon Development Strategies and NAMAs.
Comments and feedback are most welcome to:  
milh@dtu.dk 
Miriam Hinostroza
Head of Programme 
Energy and Carbon Finance, UNEP Risø Centre
 
 
1 According to paragraph 37 of the decisions adopted by the Conference of the Parties (FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1); it “...requests the Subsidiary Body for 
Scientific and Technological Advice to develop general guidelines for domestic Measurement, Reporting and Verification of domestically-supported nationally 
appropriate mitigation actions.
2 Annex IV. Modalities and guidelines for international consultation and analysis: 3. The ICA process will consist of “... A technical analysis of the biennial update 
reports submitted by Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention either, as a summary of parts of their national communication in the year in which the 
national communication is presented or as a standalone update report, by a team of technical experts in consultation with the Party, and will result in a sum-
mary report. The information considered should include the national greenhouse gas inventory report, information on mitigation actions, including a description 
of such actions, an analysis of their impacts and the associated methodologies and assumptions, the progress made in their implementation and information 
on domestic measurement, reporting and verification, and on support received.
61. Introduction
Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Action (NAMA) is in-
creasingly becoming one of the fundamental concepts 
for promoting social, economic and environmental 
transformations in pursuit of low emission develop-
ment3. A number of initiatives have emerged for testing 
NAMAs through different approaches and several 
countries have made their first submissions to the UN-
FCCC reflecting initial thinking about NAMAs. Likewise, 
initiatives piloting NAMAs in different areas are growing 
among developing countries through the support of 
multiple donor agencies. Promoting NAMAs implies a 
process with multiple challenges, not only financially 
and technologically, but also more subtle issues like 
vested interests. However, if striking the right formula, it 
holds opportunities for unleashing new flows of finance 
from both public and private sources.
One of the main challenges when implementing NA-
MAs is the requirement for Measuring, Reporting and 
Verifying (MRV) in ways that are consistent, transpar-
ent, comparable, complete and accurate. Putting MRV 
systems in place with a sufficient level of rigorousness 
and harmonized with national circumstances and 
development priorities needs innovative thinking. More 
importantly, it needs the provision of official international 
guidance, which is currently under development, and 
extensive support for capacity building.
The international guidance is gradually accruing, 
recently through decisions made at COP17 in Durban. 
Here, it was decided that the scope of information to 
be provided in developing countries’ Biennial Update 
Reports (BUR), as adopted in Durban, includes not 
only a national inventory of anthropogenic emissions by 
sources4, but also a national inventory report and infor-
mation on “mitigation actions”. The information con-
tained in these BURs will be subject to an international 
consultation and analysis (ICA) process. It was further 
decided in Durban that NAMAs for which international 
support is sought may be submitted to a UNFCCC 
Registry and that information required for NAMAs is 
similar to that provided on “mitigation actions” in BURs. 
3 Low Emission Development (LED), Low Emission Development Strate-
gies (LEDS) and Low Carbon Development Strategies (LCDS) are used 
interchangeably throughout the publication
4 as well as removal by sinks of all greenhouse gases (GHGs) not controlled 
by the Montreal Protocol
While the Parties to the UNFCCC work on such guid-
ance for MRV and clarify the policy logic behind it, the 
UNEP Risø Centre and Det Norske Veritas (DNV) have 
joined forces, through funding made available by the 
UNDP’s Carbon 2012 project, to develop this publica-
tion with the objective of contributing to the interna-
tional debate and supporting early capacity building 
activities for both NAMAs and MRV. 
This Primer takes note of the important decisions made 
in Durban. Further, it assumes that MRV provisions ulti-
mately will build on existing experience from emissions 
reduction efforts, including MRV practices of CDM 
projects and programmes, and procedures to quantify 
and account for emission reductions under carbon 
offset schemes. 
 
72. MRV systems
When considering MRV systems for NAMAs, these 
declarations eventually become relevant. This includes 
the realization that a country’s readiness to receive 
general or targeted sector budget support generally 
depends on the existence of: 1) a national policy and 
strategy for development priorities in relevant sectors, 
2) a stable macro-economic framework and 3) a public 
financial management system so as to justify the exter-
nal budget support5. 
A partner country’s capacity to measure and report 
on performance criteria and indicators is important, as 
these become the focus of subsequent dialogue on 
progress and results, but no widely recognized stand-
ard methodology exists for the evaluation of budget 
support, including sector wide approaches. A com-
monly used framework has been developed by the 
OECD/DAC using logical framework terminology (input, 
output, outcome and impact) and standard evaluation 
criteria such as relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, sus-
tainability and impact6. For joint evaluations it is impor-
tant to have a dialogue on the choice of methodology 
and a common understanding of the terminology used. 
In many cases MRV systems are based on a standard 
set by a standard setting body such as the International 
Standard Organization (ISO). In such cases the purpose 
of the MRV system is to ensure compliance with the 
standard which needs to reflect the specific objective of 
the programme or policy for which it has been estab-
lished. In the case of NAMAs, a standard could provide 
requirements for measuring both emissions reduction 
as well as environmental sustainability of a given activ-
ity.
To ensure the compliance with a given standard (or ob-
jective), measurement of performance is necessary, i.e. 
the ‘M’ in MRV. In the current context ‘measurement’ is 
often used interchangeably with ‘monitoring’. The two 
are not the same, however, and are not equally feasible 
in all contexts. In simple terms, all that can be measured 
can also be monitored; but not all that is monitored can 
be necessarily measured quantitatively. As the original 
5 EC (2007). Aid Delivery Methods. Guidelines on the Programming, Design 
and Management of General Budget Support. Tools and Methods Series, 
European Commission. 1.
6 DAC, D. A. C. (2002). Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results 
Based Management, OECD: 40.
Measurement, Reporting and Verification (MRV) has 
taken an increasingly prominent role in climate change 
negotiations. MRV frameworks provide assurance to 
stakeholders that projects and programmes meet clear 
standards; that their implementation is carefully moni-
tored, and that progress is reported and the results 
verified. 
MRV is widely used in many contexts, with many differ-
ent purposes, practices and interpretations. It is also a 
fundamental element of governance throughout history, 
not least in production based tax systems for instance 
for agriculture. In more recent history, different MRV 
approaches have been adopted in international treaties 
such as Whaling Convention, the Strategic Arms Limi-
tation Treaty and the Montreal Protocol, or in institutions 
like the International Atomic Energy Agency. Probably 
the most directly relevant source of experience is the 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) where MRV 
confirms compliance to a standard (the methodology) 
and provides assurance that the CDM project offset 
requirements have been met, in which case CERs can 
be issued. The common aspect in all these international 
initiatives is that they define an objective, a baseline or 
base case from which a deviation is desirable, a meas-
urement system, a reporting system and a verification 
system. The overall design, however, differs from case 
to case. 
MRV systems are, therefore, commonplace and there 
is plenty of experience to learn from. NAMAs reflect a 
global objective of emissions reduction and represent 
not only a platform for national mitigation action, but 
also actions that are collaborative efforts between de-
veloping and developed countries. Such collaboration 
may take many forms, some of which may find inspira-
tion in current frameworks for development coopera-
tion. Traditional development assistance has over the 
years developed from stand-alone projects to include 
programmes, sector-wide approaches and budget 
support. In this transition there has been particular 
focus on MRV, reflecting a general concern with aid 
effectiveness in development cooperation. Principles for 
national ownership and mutual accountability for results 
are agreed in the Paris Declaration 2005 and the follow 
up Accra Agenda for Action 2008 signed by developed 
and developing country governments and multilateral 
institutions. 
8texts in the climate negotiations speak of ‘measure-
ment’, this term is used throughout this Primer. 
2 .1 MRV for Nationally Appropriate Mitigation 
Actions
The term ‘NAMAs’ originates in the Bali Action Plan 
(CP.13, 2007) defining the concept as ‘nationally ap-
propriate mitigation actions by developing country 
parties in the context of sustainable development, 
supported and enabled by technology, financing and 
capacity-building.’ However, the international climate 
change negotiations are yet to produce a final defini-
tion and modus operandi for NAMAs. This has left the 
scene open to stakeholders to the negotiation process 
to structure and define NAMAs through projects and 
concepts. It is understood from the Cancun negotia-
tion texts7, though, that differentiation is made between 
supported and unilateral NAMAs: 
1. Unilateral NAMAs – autonomous actions taken by 
developing countries to reduce domestic GHGs 
(domestically funded and unilaterally implemented)
2. Supported NAMAs – actions undertaken with finan-
cial, technological and/or capacity building support 
from developed countries
These two definitions are founded in negotiation texts 
adopted by the COP and form the basis for the struc-
tures that are being developed around NAMAs. How-
ever, it is not evident from the negotiation texts– and it 
has indeed been rejected by some Parties – that the 
NAMAs can form the future basis for a carbon market. 
Many market actors, however, have proposed to add to 
the ‘NAMA typology’ a third type, namely 
3. Credit-Generating NAMAs (or new mechanism) – 
actions that produce credits for sale in the global 
carbon market. This category is currently not part 
of official negotiations.
The third type is obviously closely linked to current 
experiences with the CDM and is discussed more in 
the context of ‘new market mechanisms’. It has been 
included in this Primer as a NAMA category, not as a 
policy statement, but for the purpose of sharing existing 
experience and deliberations on how the principles of 
MRV of a market based mechanism can be carried 
over to a NAMA framework. 
NAMAs should originate in general national develop-
ment planning processes and the national appropriate-
ness of mitigation actions flows implicitly from there. 
7 e.g. FCCC/AWGLCA/2010/8
UNEP Risø published a Primer for COP17 that links 
the NAMAs to Low Carbon Development Strategies8 
(LCDS). LCDS are economy-wide exercises that map 
out reduction options within the framework of current 
development objectives and priorities, practically identi-
fying areas where a shift in priorities or a shift in tech-
nology can bring about emissions reduction without 
jeopardizing overall long term development objectives. 
The result could be 
1. a list of projects and programmes that are prior-
itized based on mitigation assessments
2. a strategy for financing 
3. a definition of the institutional framework and 
4. the outline of national policies to achieve such de-
velopment at the national level. 
Hence, the LEDS entails the development of a strategic 
framework for the implementation of prioritized reduc-
tion options. This realization may be helpful for develop-
ing country Parties’ response to the invitation extended 
by COP17 to submit more information relating to 
nationally appropriate mitigation actions, including 
underlying assumptions and methodologies, sectors 
and gases covered, global warming potential values 
used, support needs for implementation of nationally 
appropriate mitigation actions and estimated mitigation 
outcomes. 
 
NAMAs may be divided into policy NAMAs and project 
NAMAs (see Figure 1). Project NAMAs are most likely 
to resemble CDM activities or Programmes of Activities 
(PoAs) in cases where large numbers of smaller installa-
tions comprise relevant mitigation responses. It may be 
expected, though, that NAMAs probably rarely will en-
tail stand-alone activities as long as CDM continues in 
parallel. Instead, emerging from more strategic planning 
processes, NAMAs will most likely represent concerted 
actions that include several different but interlinked miti-
gation activities and many different sources of funding. 
It will be the task of the MRV system to keep track of 
the overall performance of the NAMAs. As the MRV 
system must reflect the objective of the activity that is 
to be documented, it is very important to understand 
the differences between the NAMA types and how this 
may impact on the design of the MRV system. The next 
chapter discusses lessons learnt from MRV frameworks 
of existing emission reduction regimes. This will be 
used to define some key MRV elements that can be 
applied to the design of MRV frameworks for different 
NAMAs.
8 Low Carbon Development Strategies – A Primer on Framing Nationally 
Appropriate Mitigation Actions in Developing Countries
9 
Figure 1: NAMAs in the context of LCDS
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3. Current MRV 
frameworks  
for greenhouse  
gas emission 
to determine how it achieves this. For instance, it can 
redesign its installation, have shorter working hours or 
change the fuel used. 
A CDM project, on the other hand, which is based on 
an offset system, will first need to define what action 
it will implement to achieve the emission reduction 
(project activity), then demonstrate that the project 
activity is additional and that it contributes to sustain-
able development and finally determine the emissions 
reduction at the end of a monitoring period. It has no 
freedom to choose how it achieves its emissions reduc-
tion and must follow the monitoring plan established in 
the Project Design Document (PDD) to the letter.
In the case of a mitigation policy or an incentive pro-
gramme, the participant may only have to demonstrate 
its willingness to use a certain low carbon technology 
or energy efficient practice. No actual accounting of 
emissions reduction is undertaken. Instead, an approxi-
mate level of emissions reduction achieved through the 
initiative can be estimated.
3 .1 Implementation of MRV routines
Implementation of the MRV framework involves the 
measuring, reporting and verification of emissions re-
ductions – or other programme objectives as the case 
may be. For instance in the CDM, additional objectives 
serving the promotion of sustainable development 
are included, though in this case no MRV system to 
account for the sustainability promotion effect of CDM 
activities has been introduced. 
Measurement
Measurement is the first essential element in an over-
all assessment of the efficiency in implementing any 
As discussed in Chapter 2 MRV systems are common-
place throughout economy and policy sectors of activ-
ity. MRV systems are used extensively in a number of 
mechanisms and trading schemes for greenhouse gas 
emissions reductions worldwide. The most common 
ones are listed in Table 1. These programmes meas-
ure and assess the emissions of individual installations 
or actions/projects and are a product of processes in 
which political decisions have been made to form the 
framework of both the mitigation programme and the 
MRV system. 
Any MRV framework must carefully define its bounda-
ries, objectives and incentives for implementation. A 
prime focus in MRV frameworks is the role and neces-
sary actions of those responsible for the Monitoring, 
the Reporting as well as the Verification. However, this 
cannot be determined without a clear definition of the 
scope of the activity that needs to be monitored and 
ultimately verified. The scope of CDM, for example, is 
to generate real verifiable reductions in emissions of the 
6 Kyoto Protocol gasses compared to a Business as 
Usual (BaU) scenario while contributing to sustainable 
development. The scope of the EU ETS, on the other 
hand, is to ensure the tradability of CO2 emission al-
lowances in a defined number of installations within the 
European Community. Although both scopes require 
the monitoring of emissions, there is a considerable 
difference in the actual monitoring and reporting func-
tions, and the information that need to be verified.
In the EU ETS, which is a cap and trade system, the 
installation will have to monitor and record the total 
amount of CO2 emitted at the end of the calendar year 
and ensure that the emissions are within their permitted 
levels (allowance held). The GHG emitting entity is free 
11
Table 1: Emission Mitigation Systems
Trading Schemes Standard Scope Jurisdiction of 
operations
Legal 
 Framework
Australian Clean 
Energy Act 2011 
and National Green-
house and Energy 
Reporting Act
National Green-
house and Energy 
Reporting (Measure-
ment) Determination 
2008 and associ-
ated NGER Techni-
cal Guidelines 
Reduction of 6 GHG 
Kyoto Protocol Gases 
emitted from the station-
ary energy, industrial 
processing, resources 
and waste sectors.
All States and Ter-
ritories in Australia 
including external 
Territories and 
Australia’s exclusive 
economic zone.
Common-
wealth Law
1990 Clean Air Act 
(Acid Rain Pro-
gramme)
Actual measured 
emission levels
SO2 & NOx emissions Federal Govern-
ment USA (All 
States of USA)
Federal Law
California Climate 
AB32
Reporting Protocols Reduction of 6 GHG 
Kyoto Protocol Gases
State of California State Law
Clean Development 
Mechanism
Project Activity spe-
cific Methodology
Reduction of 6 Kyoto 
Protocol Greenhouse 
Gases
Contribution to sustain-
able development
All non-Annex 
I countries that 
ratified the Kyoto 
Protocol
International 
Treaty
European Union 
Emission Trading 
Scheme (EU ETS)
Installation specific 
monitoring protocol
Reduction of CO2 
emissions of a defined 
number of sectors and 
sizes of installations 
(As of 2013, scope is 
extended to include also 
N2O)
All member states 
of the European 
Community
EU Directive – 
operationalized 
into national 
legislation
South Korean 
Emission Trading 
Scheme (Korean 
ETS)
CDM Methodology 
& local developed 
Technology Meth-
odologies
Reduction of 6 GHG 
Kyoto Protocol Gases
South Korea National Legis-
lation
Western Climate 
Initiative (WCI)
Reporting Protocols Reduction of 6 GHG 
Kyoto Protocol Gases
7 states of the 
United States and 
4 states of Canada
State Law
mitigation action. It consists of the collection of essen-
tial data needed to conduct reporting and ultimately, 
verification. What is required for measurement entirely 
depends on the ultimate claims that are to be made 
as part of the mitigation programme. Although, gener-
ally, monitoring will be associated with the measur-
ing of emissions, there are also other elements that 
may require monitoring. Under the CDM, a variety of 
monitoring can exist within one mitigation programme, 
while under the Acid Rain programme the monitoring is 
limited to the actual emissions at the smokestack. 
The wider the scope of the mitigation programmes, the 
more flexible the monitoring requirements have to be. 
The Acid Rain Programme is relatively simplistic in its 
monitoring as it only considers a restricted sector with 
a relatively easily measurable gas. The CDM, however, 
with its 15 different sectoral scopes will have to adopt 
monitoring requirements that suit each of the sec-
tors. This also requires access to a significantly larger 
number of specialists in order to determine whether the 
monitoring requirements are able to provide the infor-
mation needed to measure the emissions. Designers of 
mitigation schemes such as AB 32 and WCI (see Table 
1) have spent considerable time prior to the launch of 
the programmes to develop monitoring protocols and 
only expand their scope of applicability once a new 
monitoring protocol is developed. Other schemes such 
12
as the Korean ETS, addresses this need for develop-
ment of monitoring requirements by using the method-
ologies of the CDM EB. 
Reporting
In current emissions reduction activities, reporting 
focuses on the specific installations under scrutiny and 
the emission sources and gases of the project activity. 
Reporting can generally be divided into 
 »  Direct emissions reporting; and
 »  Indirect emissions reporting.
Under direct emissions reporting, the installation is gen-
erally required to install meters that automatically report 
directly into a dedicated database, hence an automated, 
electronic system. The indirect emissions reporting nor-
mally rely on the manual registration and calculation of 
emissions which are then verified before being registered 
as final emissions data. Direct emission reporting offers 
the advantage of complete, accurate and real time data 
to the government. This means that the need for special-
ized Measurement and Reporting expertise at the instal-
lation level is either eliminated or kept at a minimum. On 
the other hand, experience shows that although meters 
are installed and function correctly, all emission sources 
are not always identified and metered by the installation 
which results in incomplete emissions reporting. This 
incompleteness can sometimes be explained by rigid 
reporting requirements that do not always fit with the 
individual installation’s method of operation.
Indirect emissions reporting, such as in the CDM and 
the EU ETS, allows flexibility between the different instal-
lations since they can normally introduce local variations 
in how they obtain the relevant data. This system is 
quite demanding on the installations and requires spe-
cialized experience and competence in order to work 
effectively. This is particularly true when the installation 
has to interpret a methodology in order to be in compli-
ance with its monitoring and reporting requirements. As 
a consequence, an MRV system that relies on indirect 
emissions reporting normally requires a considerable 
amount of supportive documentation to assist the in-
stallation in undertaking the monitoring and reporting as 
well as the verifier in performing the verification.
Verification
In many of the climate change mitigation programmes, 
the MRV frameworks use external independent verifica-
tion (third party) to confirm that the monitoring and re-
porting is in line with the requirements. In the schemes 
in New Zealand, Australia and the US, however, verifi-
cation is either done by the company itself (2nd and 1st 
party verification) or by government inspectors. Al-
though the latter can generally be seen as another form 
of 3rd party verification, the former is often used where 
there are strong national criminal prosecution laws. For 
example, first party verification in the US, where the 
company or CEO of the company states that it has 
verified the data and considers them in compliance, is 
often effective enough as the respective environmental 
legislation can make the CEOs personally liable for any 
misstatements about the company’s environmental 
compliance. In countries where CEOs cannot be made 
personally liable for a company’s environmental perfor-
mance, this structure is not feasible. 
The verification, like monitoring, needs to be clearly 
defined and in line with the objectives of the mitigation 
programme. If the aim of the verification is to deter-
mine that the information in the monitoring system 
and reporting is “adequate”, it will not be possible to 
obtain any value out of the verification in relation to 
the company’s compliance with legal requirements. 
For example, although one of the objectives of CDM 
is the contribution to sustainable development the 
only assessment made is at the time of project valida-
tion. Consequently, once the project is registered and 
implemented, there is no option of making any state-
ment concerning the project’s actual contribution to 
sustainable development as no parameters to assess 
that effect are being measured and verified, unless this 
is voluntarily included in the monitoring plan. 
3 .2 Governance of MRV systems
The differences in scope and approach for emissions 
reduction related programmes are a result of local 
framework conditions and local government priorities 
and principles for implementation as well as local or 
international laws and regulations that stipulate authori-
ties, responsibilities and accreditations. 
Laws and regulations
Each country has its own way of formulating legislation 
and this has implication for the way in which climate 
change mitigation programmes are designed and how 
their MRV structures are implemented. There is a large 
variety in legal governance among the national and 
international programmes listed in Table 1, including dif-
ferences in legislative bodies and legislation levels. The 
table lists the jurisdictions of the different programmes 
and the legal frameworks that range from the regional 
State Level (e.g. AB32, WCI) to the international level 
(e.g. CDM). 
Each of the programmes have their own legal framework 
which regulates the operationalization and control of the 
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programme and its ability to interact with other mitigation 
programmes (e.g. EU ETS accepting CDM EB and AB 
32 accepting offsets from WCI). While regional legislation 
(AB32, WCI) and national legislation (Korean ETS) may 
have more control and direct enforcement power, multi-
national (EU ETS) or international (CDM) legislation have 
a more common application and enshrine an overall 
commitment from participating governments. 
Embedding MRV in legislation necessitate the consid-
eration of a number of key elements that have direct 
impact on the effectiveness of the MRV system. The 
legislation will need to cover:
 » Authorities – which organisation is the authority and 
what does the authority entail?
 » Responsibilities – which organisation is responsible 
for implementing which parts of the legislation / 
programme?
 » Accreditation – which organisation awards accredi-
tation to third parties, if such parties are necessary 
for the functioning of the system, and what needs 
to be demonstrated in order to achieve accredita-
tion?
 » Compliance – which organisation will endorse the 
compliance with the requirements? 
 » Reporting deadlines – at what date or at which 
frequency does the reporting have to be submitted 
and/or verified?
 » Issuance – which organisation issues proof of 
compliance or allowances or credits, as the case 
may be?
 » Penalties – what are the consequences in cases of 
non-compliance? 
Authorities, Responsibilities & Accreditation
Ensuring proper authorisations and delegation of respon-
sibilities are important elements in the governance of any 
scheme. If defined properly, this will avoid blockage in 
the MRV system and ensure its effective and transparent 
operation. Many implementation problems for the CDM 
have been attributed to the lack of clear authorisation and 
allocation of responsibilities. In the Kyoto Protocol and the 
Marrakesh Accord accredited DOEs were assigned to be 
the extended arm of the CDM Executive Board (EB) and 
to validate and verify CDM projects, but in order to over-
see the work of the project participants and the DOEs the 
CDM EB initiated a high level of project re-assessments 
(e.g. introduced the registration issuance team, com-
pleteness checks and performance assessments) which 
became a bottleneck in the process. 
As part of the governance of the MRV framework, it 
is important to provide clear direction on the qualifica-
tions required to perform the measuring, reporting and 
verification. In those schemes that require accredita-
tion of third parties to perform the verification, the 
accreditation process ensures that the competence 
requirements are met. The person or organisation to 
be accredited has to demonstrate their competence 
in assessing the implementation of the measurement 
requirements and the reported data.
In the EU ETS, there are a number of different ways 
in which entities or individuals can be accredited. 
Although most countries use their National Accredita-
tion Bodies to accredit entities, some countries rely on 
accreditation of individuals that is obtained through an 
examination at a dedicated recognised institution. 
The advantage of a centralised accreditation approach, 
as adopted under the CDM, is that entities accredited 
have a common standard or level of competence. The 
decentralised accreditation model of the EU ETS has 
resulted in a complex maze of different accreditation 
types which makes it harder to understand who can do 
what in which sector or country and what level of com-
petence is required to perform the verification services. 
Issuance and Compliance
Once the verification of the monitoring and reporting 
activities is complete, an assessment of whether the 
project or installation has met the compliance criteria 
can be performed. The next step is to officially confirm 
this compliance. For example, in the case of CDM, a 
request of issuance can be submitted to the CDM EB 
while in the EU ETS the verification statement allows 
the installation to upload its allowance compliance 
account. Most programmes clearly separate the role 
of verification of the emission with the actual issuance 
of the emission reduction (e.g. CERs by CDM EB and 
Verification by DOEs or compliance with maximum 
emission levels by Competent Authority of the EU 
Member State and Verification by EU ETS Verifier). This 
is partly done to allow for additional checking. Further, 
as the units that are being issued or surrendered are 
considered government property, they should not be is-
sued or governed by the private sector. However, there 
are also cases in environmental legislation where the 
verification body is responsible for overseeing compli-
ance with regulations.
Penalties
In order to have an effective MRV system that is taken 
seriously by all stakeholders, each of the climate 
change programmes have a penalities component. The 
penalties are issued when the implementing entity does 
not follow the rules of the programme and as such has 
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failed its MRV. In some climate change programmes the 
implementing entity will have to pay a penalty fee for 
not complying with the requirements of the programme 
(e.g. EU ETS, AUS ETS, Acid Rain Programme etc) 
while in other cases the penalty results in a reduced 
number of offsets being issued (e.g. CDM). In both 
cases the company operating the emissions reduc-
tion facility will have failed to follow the measurement 
and reporting requirements of the specific regulatory 
system. 
In cap&trade programmes the implementing entity is 
also often penalised by raising its emissions reduction 
targets for the monitoring period(s) following the period 
in which a non-compliance was observed – in addition 
to monetary penalties. In those cases, any shortfall in 
the original reporting period will have to be made good 
in the next reporting period in addition to its normal 
reduction target (EU ETS). 
The penalty system will normally allow the penalised en-
tity to seek recourse on decisions that they believe are 
incorrect. As such the penalty system and the levels of 
the penalties are well defined within the MRV part of the 
legislation, as most systems rely on the national court 
system to settle any disputes in relation to a) the level of 
the penalty and b) the actually validity of the penalty. 
 
Table 2: Basic elements of MRV system
MRV Elements Different types and options
Scope •	 Cap & Trade
•	 Offsets 
•	 Incentive Programme (Policy)
Programme Oversight 
Appeals / Legislative
•	 National Accreditation Body
•	 Government Department
•	 International Body
•	 International Body
Issuance and Compliance 
Body
•	 Government Body
•	 Third Party
•	 Second Party
•	 First Party
•	 Domestic Standard
Standards •	 ISO Standard
•	 International Recognised Standard (UNFCCC, IPCC, CDM EB, etc.)
•	 Bilateral Standard
Verification (Control Entity and 
qualifications)
•	 Government Department
•	 Third Party
•	 Second Party
•	 First Party
Monitoring & Reporting •	 Publically available
MRV Reporting at National 
Level
•	 Publically available in aggregate basis (UN national inventory basis)
•	 Publically available on participant basis (registry)
•	 Internally available
•	 National Legislation
•	 International Body
•	 Control Entity
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programmes with respect to MRV and compliance con-
ditions. A summary of these elements and their different 
types is given in Table 2.
As an example, the table below applies the main MRV 
elements to the EU ETS and CDM. This illustrates how 
differently the programmes are designed and how this 
impacts on the MRV framework as a whole. 
Table 3: MRV Elements for EU ETS and CDM
MRV Elements Different types and options CDM
Scope •	 CO2 emissions
•	 N2O emissions (from 1/1/2013)
•	 Specified Installations
•	 6 Kyoto Protocol Gases
Programme Oversight •	 EU Commission with National 
government transition into local 
legislation
•	 COP/MOP
•	 CDM EB
Appeals •	 European Court
•	 National Courts
•	 CDM EB
Issuance and Compliance 
Body
•	 Competent Authority •	 CDM EB
Standards •	 EU Directive
•	 Installation specific monitoring plan
•	 CDM Modalities & Procedures
•	 Project Activity specific approved 
methodology
Verification (Control Entity and 
Qualifications)
•	 Third Party Entities •	 Designated Operating Entity
Monitoring & Reporting •	 Individual Installations •	 Project Proponent implementing 
the project activity
MRV Reporting at National 
Level
•	 National Registries •	 Non / CDM Registry
3 .3 Key elements for MRV frameworks 
The above discussion has focused on some of the key 
elements in the MRV frameworks in current climate mit-
igation programmes. It has highlighted the importance 
of clearly defining the scope of the programmes, the 
impact of different legislative frameworks underpinning 
the programme and the different forms of governance. 
Further, it has briefly discussed the implementation of 
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4. MRV elements  
for NAMAs
the boundaries should generally be established using 
the same unit, essentially emissions reduction. If not, 
distinguishing the effect from different NAMAs will be 
difficult. Many initiatives are likely not to be formulated 
directly in emissions reduction terms and not immedi-
ately possible to translate into tons of CO2 emissions 
reduction, for instance. a grant scheme or a labeling 
initiative. Nevertheless, even approximations will be 
useful for the determination and allocation of effects of 
different initiatives to avoid double counting. 
4 .2 Baselines
Most MRV systems are designed to measure and 
report against either a standard for compliance, or a 
baseline. Since the inception of the UNFCCC, the con-
cept of baselines has been central in climate change 
policy and is used to describe a business as usual 
development from which a deviation is desired.
Baselines are essential for measuring the success of 
all GHG policies or programmes, and NAMAs are no 
exception. The issues associated with the establish-
ment of baselines are beyond the scope of this Primer. 
In short, while there is no standard definition, a baseline 
is generally a base case scenario for economic and 
productive activities and related GHG emissions within 
a geographical area without GHG mitigation policies 
or projects. A baseline must be established in order to 
provide the best possible estimate of real GHG emis-
sions reduction achieved through the implementation of 
a NAMA compared to the baseline or business as usual 
scenario. 
Baselines may be absolute or relative. For example, in-
dexed baselines could be developed in order to meas-
ure the efficacy of a NAMA. The most common type 
of indexed baselines is an intensity baseline, e.g. GHG 
emissions per physical sectoral metric (e.g. tonnes of 
steel) or per unit of GDP for a country baseline. Tech-
nology penetration baselines could be used to measure 
the success of diffusion of technologies into a country 
as a result of a NAMA (e.g. number of trigeneration 
units installed against a baseline). An absolute base-
line, on the other hand, is the actual emissions during 
As outlined earlier, the array of NAMAs is quite diverse 
and this will be mirrored in the design of MRV struc-
tures for NAMAs. The diversity in the choices of insti-
tutional and operational solutions that was described 
in Chapter 3 can provide inspiration for the design of 
structures in support of NAMAs, both at the national as 
well as the international level. So far, only few elements 
of the institutional structure to support the NAMA/MRV 
system have been elaborated as part of climate change 
negotiations, but obviously the MRV structures for the 
various NAMAs must reflect the set of indicators and 
metrics that are relevant and applicable for the specific 
NAMAs. In this chapter, the different MRV elements that 
were introduced in Chapter 3 will be discussed in rela-
tion to NAMAs.
4 .1 Scope - project, programme and policy 
boundaries
It is essential when proposing NAMAs to consider the 
boundaries of a given initiative, though the diversity of 
possible NAMAs means that boundary setting may be 
complex. While some boundaries may be geographi-
cal, others might be sectoral, and yet others might 
be policy related. If such NAMAs overlap, it must be 
determined to which NAMAs the result of a given action 
is attributed. This is particularly crucial for supported 
NAMAs – and indeed for credited NAMAs – as double 
counting should be avoided. Transparency in measur-
ing and reporting of performance is a first precondition 
for addressing such issues in setting and observing 
boundaries. Coordination between institutions respon-
sible for overlapping NAMAs is equally important. Some 
inspiration for the setting of boundaries may be found 
in the current CDM methodologies, particularly with 
relevance to project type NAMAs and for Programmes 
of Activities. Boundary setting for sectors could equally 
find inspiration here, while for policy NAMAs a more 
detailed assessment of expected effects and the attri-
bution of these effects to one or more NAMAs cover-
ing the same area of intervention would be required. In 
those cases, where NAMAs are overlapping, e.g. if in 
agreement with two different donors both a sector-wide 
activity as well as a subsector activity is defined, and 
these are not merged into a single sectorwide NAMA, 
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a specific period by a source regardless of its level of 
production and/or amount of products produced.
Many countries have submitted voluntary pledges for 
the Copenhagen Accord in the form of a reduction 
target compared against a business-as-usual scenario. 
The Cancun agreement took note of the voluntary 
pledges submitted to the Accord in the doc FCCC/AW-
GLCA/2011/INF.1. At the macro level this corresponds 
to projecting a probable emission trajectory if no action 
is taken beyond business as usual, (i.e. the baseline), 
and then making a pledge for action beyond business 
as usual that will result in a reduction of GHG emis-
sions. If projections are the result of sectoral assess-
ments and not less specific extrapolations of economic 
growth and emission intensity expectations, they could 
constitute baselines against which sector initiatives 
could be measured. The point of departure for such 
baselines is an inventory of emissions, such as already 
provided through the national Climate Change Com-
munications, and such as is expected in future biennial 
reporting, though an entire inventory of all emissions in 
all sectors is of course not necessary if only emissions 
reduction in one or a few sectors are proposed. Here, a 
sectoral inventory and baseline is sufficient. 
Countries should seek to establish or develop sectoral 
baseline inventories at the national level if they pursue 
support, possibly crediting, for sectoral initiatives. But 
baselines may equally be useful for unilateral initiatives, 
e.g. if domestic emission trading systems are consid-
ered9. Establishing sectoral baselines are not without 
challenges. For instance, in countries with different 
types of NAMAs the effective implementation of one 
NAMA may impact on the baseline of other NAMAs. 
For example, measurement of the efficacy of a NAMA 
to promote the uptake of energy efficient household 
appliances (the efficacy measured in emissions reduc-
tion terms as opposed to quantitative uptake) could 
be compromised by a successful NAMA to increase 
the contribution of renewable energy to the grid. If the 
grid emission factor decreases (by replacing fossil fuel 
based power with renewable sources), the amount 
of emissions reduction per efficient unit of household 
equipment is less – but of course the final outcome 
would still be positive.
9 see Wolfgang Sterk & Florian Mersmann “Domestic Emission Trading 
Systems in Developing Countries: State of Play and Future Prospects”, 
Wuppertal Institute 2011, where six developing countries with possible 
domestic ETS are analysed: Brazil, China, India, Kazakhstan, Mexico and 
South Korea
4 .3 Measurement 
Having established a baseline from which the NAMA 
has the objective to deviate, and having delineated 
the NAMA boundaries, the affiliated MRV systems will 
be measuring, reporting and verifying data that are 
collected and kept according to procedures agreed. 
Such procedures may have been agreed either at the 
international level through the UNFCCC or at the bilat-
eral or national level for a specific NAMA coordinated 
by, for example, a Central Coordinating Unit. A Central 
Coordinating Unit (CCU) is thought to be a necessary 
national institution or function to align all emissions 
reduction related sector strategies and initiatives and 
bring them forward for national and, essentially, interna-
tional financing. For further discussion of the CCU, see 
section 4.4 on Programme Oversight.
For all NAMA types the data collection and evaluation 
processes should be transparent and traceable. Data 
collection systems which are transferable across NAMA 
types and sectors will need to be established as an 
integrated part of NAMA design and implementation.
Establishment of effective MRV frameworks for NA-
MAs means putting into place practical and achievable 
frameworks for measurement, reporting and verifica-
tion while maintaining the high standards necessary for 
ensuring real mitigation. Measurement is a prerequisite 
for verification. Measurement requires a measurable 
unit to be identified and recorded, and those records 
made available for verification through reporting sys-
tems. In the following, various measurable parameters 
are presented. These can be drawn upon for unilateral 
and supported NAMAs as well as, potentially, credited 
NAMAs. While GHG reduction benefits can be relatively 
easily quantified for NAMAs with easily measurable 
emissions reductions, quantification will be more dif-
ficult for many policy-related NAMAs. It can be difficult 
to establish traditional GHG emissions reduction related 
indicators for policy based NAMAs as the direct causal 
links between the policies and the resulting emissions 
reduction are not always clear. Hence different sets of 
indicators and metrics must be considered to be able 
to monitor their effects or whether objectives are met. 
A measure of caution should also be added, though. 
NAMAs may well be defined for entire sectors and con-
sist of a number of measures, some of which are not 
necessarily measurable neither in financial nor in emis-
sion terms. If the entire sector has been benchmarked 
and emissions are reduced comparably, there is no 
need to attribute the parts of the reduction to specific 
initiatives, as long as the overall objective has been 
achieved. The only reason why such possible bound-
18
ary drawing may be required is if individual sources of 
funding for individual parts of the entire set of measures 
wish to see the result of their specific contribution. In 
these cases, a collusion of financial sources should be 
encouraged so as to reflect the structure and nature (in 
this case a sector-wide initiative) of the NAMA. 
4.3.1 Quantitative and Qualitative Metrics
Metrics effectively fall under two primary categories: 
quantitative and qualitative metrics. Quantitative metrics 
are metrics for variables which can be measured us-
ing standard units of measurement and may include 
financial, technical and process data, while qualitative 
metrics are for variables which cannot be measured 
using standard units of measurement and may include 
financial, technical and process data. In addition, met-
rics can be categorized as inputs acting towards GHG 
mitigation or the outputs of mitigation activities in terms 
of real measurable GHG reductions. For example, input 
metrics might include the number of activities estab-
lished, units constructed, programmes implemented or 
funds disbursed in an effort to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions. Output metrics refer instead to the causal 
relationship between an action and the actual GHG 
reduction, e.g., the amount of diesel fuel replaced by 
natural gas in a public transport NAMA, from which it is 
possible to calculate actual GHG emission reductions. 
The range of metrics applied to a NAMA could include 
quantitative and qualitative as well as input and output 
metric types. Metrics may include data from both donor 
and host countries. 
Quantitative Financial Metrics
Financial metrics include the financial flows from donor 
to recipient institutions and from those institutions to 
funded activities and operations. Their usefulness in 
respect of NAMAs is primarily to ensure the efficacy of 
funds in conjunction with one or more supplemental 
metrics. On their own, therefore, financial metrics are 
unlikely to demonstrate real reductions in emissions, 
but will form part of a mix of metrics useful for assess-
ing the performance of supported NAMAs. In particular, 
these metrics will allow for assessment of such aspects 
as the cost effectiveness of NAMA activities and the 
financial flow of climate finance to developing coun-
tries. Funding through the prospective Green Climate 
Fund or the Global Environmental Facility is likely to be 
much more easily accounted for at the international 
level, while funding provided through bilateral channels 
may be more difficult to measure and verify. Funding 
institutions may choose to carry out their own auditing 
of funding flows and there may be an opportunity to 
rely upon some of the new climate fund standards that 
have been developed such as the Climate Bond Stand-
ard developed by the Climate Bond Initiative10. The 
outcomes of third party MRV related to those standards 
could potentially be incorporated at the international 
level.
Although measurement of financial metrics is relatively 
straight forward from a technical perspective, there 
is a need to ensure that robust financial accounting 
systems including data systems and record keeping 
arrangements for financial and investment flows are in 
place. Procedures need to be established to ensure 
that funds are allocated to activities and projects which 
are included in the particular NAMA. Where there is a 
need to first put these robust systems in place, it may 
be necessary to establish qualitative metrics to meas-
ure the progress of implementing these systems.
10 http://climatebonds.net/
Table 4: Examples of quantitative and qualitative metrics
Metrics Examples
Quantitative Financial metrics •	 Funds transferred from donor country
•	 Value of a renewable energy asset pool funded through specific donor 
finance 
•	 Amount of donor funds spent on a national education programme
Quantitative Process metrics •	 Number of energy efficiency training programmes that have been delivered
•	 Number of SMEs that have been provided funding for energy efficiency 
programmes
Quantitative Technical metrics •	 Number of new trigeneration units installed in a regional grid
•	 Emission reductions in that grid compared to the baseline
Qualitative Process metrics •	 Status of establishment of reporting system
•	 Status of institutional strengthening programme
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Quantitative Process Metrics
Quantitative process metrics include activities which are 
procedural in nature and can be measured in terms of 
number of activities completed. Quantitative process 
metrics are relatively simple to document, record and 
report, provided that appropriate administrative practic-
es are established to ensure that thorough documenta-
tion is kept. Quantitative process metrics are unlikely to 
require significant capacity building and do not require 
sophisticated data management systems. They are, 
therefore, relatively easily implemented. However, like 
quantitative financial metrics, quantitative process met-
rics are input metrics and do not provide any indication 
on their own of NAMA effectiveness or GHG mitigation 
quantification. Their use is also primarily to ensure the 
efficacy of processes and programmes in conjunction 
with one or more additional metrics, and to demon-
strate that a NAMA is operating as planned.
Examples of quantitative process metrics include docu-
menting of and reporting on the creation of new institu-
tions or working groups, meetings held or progress in 
educational programmes.
Quantitative Technical Metrics
Quantitative technical metrics may be input or output 
based. Input technical metrics are, for example, the 
capacity of renewable energy installations. Output 
technical metrics would then be the GHG emissions 
reduction measured. The MRV frameworks for CDM 
and JI are well elaborated quantitative output technical 
metrics.
Technical metrics are the most challenging to docu-
ment, record and report. Quantitative technical metrics 
may require significant capacity building and would 
normally require sophisticated data management sys-
tems. Technical metrics may be either input or output 
metrics, as output metrics they have the capacity to 
provide the clearest evidence of real GHG reductions. 
On the other hand, they can be the most costly to 
measure and verify. They may also exhibit any errors 
and poor accuracy. Errors and inaccuracy may occur 
in the instrumental measurement or recording of data, 
resulting in erroneously reported GHG reductions. This 
is an important issue where the role of an independent 
verifier can be critical in ensuring that real GHG reduc-
tions are achieved.
Qualitative Metrics
The qualitative metrics can include assessments of the 
efficacy of activities undertaken which are procedural 
in nature. Although these are more difficult to docu-
ment, record and report, they are not likely to require 
significant capacity building and do not require sophis-
ticated data management systems. Qualitative metrics 
will be relatively simple to establish and implement, but 
will require significant local review and audit processes 
as part of the MRV process. Like quantitative process 
metrics, qualitative metrics are input metrics and do 
not provide any indication on their own of NAMA ef-
fectiveness or GHG mitigation quantification. Their use 
is primarily to ensure the efficacy of processes and 
programmes in conjunction with one or more other 
metrics, and to demonstrate that a NAMA is operating 
as planned.
Examples of qualitative metrics include documenting 
and reporting on the progress and outcomes of new 
institutions or working groups, actions implemented 
from meetings held, and measurable competency 
improvements as a result of progress in educational 
programmes.
4.3.2 Advantages and disadvantages 
Table 5 summarizes the advantages and disadvantages 
of the different types of metrics for MRV. In most cases, 
these metrics are enhanced by applying an integrated 
approach using a range of metrics. For example, quan-
titative metrics are most useful in measuring costs and 
benefits of a particular NAMA when linked to financial 
metrics. 
4 .4 Reporting and Oversight 
The responsibility for implementation and control of 
NAMAs will lie with the host country. It will therefore 
also be the host country that defines authorizations 
and responsibilities to the institutions working within 
the NAMA. NAMAs are relevant to a variety of policy 
areas and sectors, and are likely to be spread over a 
number of different ministries within the host country, 
diverse stakeholders, as well as industries with varying 
MRV experience. Hence, NAMA control structures are 
equally likely to be anchored in a number of different 
institutions. 
For national NAMA oversight, it will probably be nec-
essary to establish a Central Coordinating Unit (CCU) 
which can handle the following:
 » incorporate reporting from all line ministries and 
their regulatory bodies and keep an updated regis-
try of relevant policies and projects 
 » report financial flows to policy schemes from both 
national and international sources (e.g. the Green 
Climate Fund), including actual disbursements
 » collaborate with the line ministries and record the 
effects of regulatory initiatives compared to baseline 
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scenarios (e.g. policy NAMAs that are actions in 
themselves) 
 » oversee the application of relevant methodologies 
for assessments of emissions reduction from con-
crete project activities
 » support national and international verification teams
 » devise principles to avoid double counting of emis-
sion reduction for related NAMAs
 » build a national emissions inventory system to 
facilitate biannual update reporting (BUR) to the 
UNFCCC Secretariat 
Structuring a CCU may find some initial basis in the 
design of Designated National Authorities (DNA), cur-
rently serving as national focal points for CDM. Many 
have board members from all relevant sector minis-
tries, which mirror the diverse areas of intervention 
for emissions reduction. The CCU would equally have 
to establish communication links with the UNFCCC 
Secretariat. Further, the CCUs would benefit from hav-
ing extensive communication with the private sector for 
implementing NAMAs including, probably, a national 
approval process. However, the NAMAs and the asso-
ciated MRV systems will require more of the CCU than 
the current DNAs have been designed for. First and 
foremost, the CCU may require authority to influence 
policy development and not only determine project or 
activities compliance with national priorities. Hence, the 
CCUs might instead take the form of a ‘clearing central’ 
where essential analysis and information is gathered on 
the coordination and prioritizing of emissions reduction 
options from different sector ministries – while at the 
same time retaining current board structures for high 
level prioritization processes.
There are obvious linkages between the CCU functions 
and functions of prospective National Climate Funds 
that are gradually being established, as described by 
UNDP11: ‘By setting in place a process that aligns and 
11 Blending Climate Finance Through National Climate Funds A Guidebook 
for the Design and Establishment of National Funds to Achieve Climate 
Change Priorities, UNDP 2011 (p.10)
Table 5: Advantages and disadvantages of different types of metrics
Metric Advantages Disadvantages
Quantita-
tive  Financial 
 metrics
Information available from donors for cross 
checking
Useful for measuring cost benefit of particular 
NAMA types in particular countries
Relatively easy to establish data and record 
systems
Relatively easy to measure, report and verify
Can be verified at international level
Does not directly measure GHG reductions
May require reporting systems throughout 
the NAMA participants
Quantitative 
Process metrics
Easy to establish data and record systems
Easy to measure, report and verify
Effective for ensuring activities are progressing
Does not directly measure GHG reductions
May require reporting systems throughout 
the NAMA participants
 Quantitative 
Technical 
 metrics
Useful for measuring cost benefit of particular 
NAMA types in particular countries
Systems are well elaborated in existing UN-
FCCC CDM modalities and procedures
Panel of independent national/international 
verifiers (DOEs) established
Relatively difficult to establish data and 
record systems
May require complex inventory systems at 
the national level
Difficult to measure, report and verify
Requires in country verification
Not applicable for many types of NAMAs
Qualitative 
metrics
Easy to establish default data and record 
systems
Based on the procedural assumptions 
Performance relatively easy to measure, 
report and verify
Effective for ensuring activities are progressing
Does not directly measure GHG reductions
May require reporting systems throughout 
the NAMA participants
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supports existing general goals and strategic pro-
grammes, the NCF can provide a coordinated sup-
porting structure to a country’s national climate and 
development priorities. Further, by facilitating regular 
discussions and stakeholder engagement on national 
climate issues, an NCF can serve as a central body for 
discussion and decision-making about how the NCF 
will support national action.’ In many ways the CCU 
and the NCF can be regarded as identical and should 
probably not be set up in parallel, but rather as one 
single institution.
Should there be credited NAMAs, the CCUs (or NCFs) 
may rely on the already existing functions of the DNA, 
though it needs to be decided whether issuance of 
credits should succeed at the national or the interna-
tional level, or possibly through a two-step process 
with a national approval first followed by an issuance 
at the international level. The purpose of a national 
approval would be to keep control of the prospective 
national emissions inventory, especially in cases where 
a national emissions trading scheme is established. 
The CCU needs to have the capacity to either perform 
the verification itself or require independent verification 
of the reductions achieved. Although a trading system 
could be overseen by the CCU, it would probably not 
host it. This could, for example, be managed by a line 
ministry (e.g. for industry or energy). National trading 
systems could be combined with a national account of 
surplus credits (measured against a national objective 
for reductions) held by the CCU for potential interna-
tional trade in credits.
NAMAs shall be based on technology, finance and 
capacity building. The capacity building is likely to be 
part of (additional) development assistance and follow 
the current means of implementation. The finance and 
technology platforms for NAMAs, however, are still be-
ing formalized. Important steps were taken at COP17 in 
Durban when a decision was made to establish Climate 
Technology centres and network during 2012. Further, 
the Green Climate Fund shall provide financial support 
over and above direct development assistance. Hence, 
the CCU must also be able to: 
 » keep track of capacity building efforts, domestic 
(unilateral) as well as international
 » keep track of technology transfer and initiatives of 
the Climate Technology centers and networks
 » keep track of multilateral and bilateral assistance 
and finance flowing to the national level
 » Avoid duplication of activities 
Figure 2 illustrates the possible programme oversight 
for NAMAs with the CCU centrally placed close to the 
Ministry of Finance and in a coordinating role be-
tween line ministries, project developers and verifiers. 
It is maintaining the national registry, reporting to the 
international NAMA registry, and communicating NAMA 
proposals and requests for funding. Thus, it will provide 
information linkages between donor funding, actual 
disbursement for activities, and emissions reductions 
achieved – functions that are similar to those proposed 
for NCF structures. The CCU is likely to be a sizeable 
set-up though its structure will vary significantly accord-
ing to national circumstances. The institutional structure 
may involve line ministries or sector institutions well 
positioned to extract quantitative information related to 
the implementation of activities.
Figure 2: Simplistic institutional and functional structure
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4 .5 Verification at the national level
The structuring of the verification process may include 
different institutions. The CCU itself may assume the 
actual verification, which would correspond to second 
party verification (see Table 6). But systems may even 
rely on first party verification, where the institution or 
company responsible for the implementation of a given 
NAMA undertakes the verification through an internal 
verification process, e.g. an internal audit. Whichever 
approach chosen, Parties would need to describe 
their Quality and Assurance and Control systems that 
ensure the reliability of performance indicators (e.g. 
third party review, audit, statistical analysis) and also 
indicate whether they have any procedures in place for 
peer or technical review of data, and any provisions for 
public input and review. Table 6 gives an overview of 
the different types of control entities that can be used 
for NAMAs.
The qualifications requirements for different kinds of 
control entities that are put in place may differ. In the 
case of first and second party entities, the company 
which seeks to demonstrate its compliance with the 
NAMA may determine the qualifications of the staff un-
dertaking the verification. When the government defines 
certain levels of qualifications for the first and second 
party entities, they are often limited. For example, if the 
CEO is the only one who is able to make a compliance 
statement, it allows the government to personally make 
the CEO liable for any wrong statements made, but 
it also places a significant liability on the CEO who is 
rarely technically qualified to undertake or supervise the 
verification.
In the case of third party and government body control 
entities, the qualifications of staff are externally deter-
mined. This can be a challenge for government bod-
ies, which will need to ensure that their control units 
have working staff qualified for a number of different 
NAMA programmes. The third parties will normally 
have to demonstrate their competence through an 
accreditation process. In the absence of any specific 
requirements for Third Party assessments, Second 
Party control entities are used. These will then have to 
demonstrate to the market that they have the specific 
expertise required to develop, implement and control 
MRV requirements for NAMA. 
4.5.1 Accreditation
Accreditation is normally associated with third party 
auditing companies. In most cases the accreditation is 
done through national accreditation bodies, but there 
are also other means of accrediting. For those NAMAs 
that rely on third party audits it will be necessary to set 
up an accreditation process that clearly defines who 
can be considered a third party and what it needs to 
demonstrate in order to become accredited. This can 
be done through the government body responsible for 
the NAMA, through training centers or through the na-
tional accreditation bodies. Training centers commonly 
Table 6: Different types of Control Entities
Control Entity Description
First Party An internal audit that an organization performs on itself. Often part of an organization’s inter-
nal quality assurance procedures. Could be used in connection with a self-declaration by a 
company or CEO to confirm compliance with NAMA obligations. It could also be conducted 
prior to a 2nd or 3rd party verification, to uncover any foreseeable problems that can be 
resolved internally. 
Second Party Verification conducted by a buyer, a supplier, or another organization that has a direct inter-
est in the results of the verification. Not acceptable if, for example, GHG assertion are used 
to register allowances or credits in an emissions trading market, but may be acceptable 
in cases where an organization is providing a disclosure report on compliance with NAMA 
obligations.
Third Party Verification conducted by an independent and qualified individual or organization, depending 
on the rules and terms of the verification. Could typically be used when the GHG assertion 
is necessary in a NAMA programme with regulatory compliance implications or used in a 
transaction within an emissions trading market.
Government 
Body
Government Body is understood to be a declaration by a government institution for a com-
pany which participates in a specific NAMA. 
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focus on and specialize in individual capabilities, while 
national accreditation bodies look at both individuals’ 
and organizational capabilities of a third party control 
entity. 
4 .6 Registry, Issuance and Compliance 
In 2009, the Copenhagen Accord instituted that “sup-
ported NAMAs - those funded by Annex I (developed) 
countries - will be listed in a registry and subject to 
international measurement, reporting and verification 
(MRV)”. The Cancun agreement established a work 
programme to clarify and operationalize issues such as 
the design of the registry, international rules on MRV 
and improved greenhouse gas emissions reports from 
non-Annex I parties.
The scope, as adopted in Durban, of information to 
be provided in developing countries’ Biennial Update 
Reports (BUR), includes not only a national inventory 
of anthropogenic emissions by sources12, but also a 
national inventory report and information on “mitiga-
tion actions” as outlined below. NAMAs for which 
international support is sought are to be submitted 
to the UNFCCC Registry following the same format 
for information as for “mitigation actions” in the BUR 
(Annex III to the report of the AWG-LCA (FCCC/
AWGLCA/2011/L.4).
“Non-Annex I Parties should provide information, in a 
tabular format, on actions to mitigate climate change, 
by addressing anthropogenic emissions by sources 
and removals by sinks of all GHGs not controlled by the 
Montreal Protocol.”
It is suggested that this information where relevant 
be related to proposals for actions already submitted 
by non-Annex-I Parties. These proposals have been 
compiled in document FCCC/AWGLCA/2011/INF.1. 
Information required, according to Annex III, is 
a. Name and description of the mitigation action, 
including information on the nature of the action, 
coverage (i.e. sectors and gases), quantitative goals 
and progress indicators;
b. Information on methodologies and assumptions;
c. Objectives of the action and steps taken or envis-
aged to achieve that action;
d. Information on the progress of implementation of 
the mitigation actions and the underlying steps 
taken or envisaged, and the results achieved, such 
as estimated outcomes (metrics depending on type 
12 as well as removal by sinks of all greenhouse gases (GHGs) not controlled 
by the Montreal Protocol
of action) and estimated emissions reductions, to 
the extent possible;
e. Information on international market mechanisms.
Further, the information contained in the BURs will be 
subjected to an international consultation and analysis 
(ICA) process. Annex III states that “Parties should pro-
vide information on … domestic measurement, report-
ing and verification arrangements.”
NAMAs are governmental instruments and even though 
NAMAs do not necessarily deliver certified emission re-
ductions or other tradable carbon units, there will be a 
compliance component. If NAMAs generate a tradable 
unit, there needs to be a clear understanding of which 
entity is responsible for the creation of the tradable unit. 
The host country should be central in the issuance and 
compliance process but may delegate the responsibility 
to some kind of control entity. The issuance and com-
pliance could also be part of an international agreement 
whereby tradable units are only created when they are 
forwarded for issuance to an international reporting 
unit.
Keeping track of activities, with a view to coordinating 
and optimizing their impact, requires transparent re-
porting systems. Such systems could be anchored with 
a CCU, potentially employing open access databases, 
which would be an option that would link ideally with 
the central UNFCCC NAMA Registry.
At COP16, in Cancun, it was decided to set up a reg-
istry to record Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions 
seeking international support and to facilitate matching 
of finance, technology and capacity-building support 
for these actions. Further, it was decided to establish a 
separate section of the registry to recognize unilateral 
NAMAs of developing countries. The structure of the 
registry is not yet established, but it is clear that an 
international NAMA registry will be established within 
the UNFCCC Secretariat where developing countries 
will submit their pledges as well as their requests for 
funding for supported NAMAs to the UNFCCC.
This is where the international assistance will be record-
ed and matched against proposed mitigation actions. 
It includes the support made available by developed 
countries nd other entities and will show the support 
received for individual NAMAs. The registry can be il-
lustrated as an information matrix like the one shown in 
Figure 3– with additional registry options for matching 
finance. The information in the registry can be useful in 
assessing the impact of actions and the level of support 
at the global level. 
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The NAMA registry that is to be established by the 
UNFCCC Secretariat will include not only the categories 
presented in Figure 3 below, but probably more. The 
three NAMAs that are mentioned illustrate the linkages 
between NAMAs, all with direct or indirect impact on 
emissions reduction in the building sector, i.e.:
1. a unilateral policy NAMA measured in emissions 
(building code), 
2. a credited project NAMA measured in emissions 
(energy efficiency in the cement sector), and 
3. a supported policy NAMA measured in finance 
(guarantee for investment in grid connected renew-
able energy).
The efficiency of each initiative is influenced by the 
other. Efficient cement production will reduce the car-
bon footprint of the cement used in the building sector; 
a building code sets standards for consumption as well 
as construction to reduce the total carbon footprint of 
the building sector; the inclusion of more renewable 
energy on the grid will reduce the emissions reduc-
tion effect of energy efficiency in other sectors. Such 
linkages illustrate the importance of keeping track of 
linkages between NAMAs. The challenge is to attribute 
results to one or the other part of the concerted NAMA. 
Options for reporting finance on one and emissions on 
another entails the risk of double counting.
4 .7 Minimum MRV system requirements for 
NAMAs
The capacity of developing countries to implement 
these MRV elements will differ. It is important to estab-
lish a set of minimum MRV requirements for different 
NAMAs for guidance. Table 7 provides a suggested list 
of minimum requirements with some key characteris-
tics. 
Figure 3: NAMA Registry
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Table 7: Minimum MRV System requirements for the different NAMA types
MRV Elements 
Block
Unilateral NAMA Internationally Support-
ed NAMA
Credited NAMA
Scope Activity which impacts 
emissions of one of the KP 
gases such as:
•	 Energy efficiency pro-
gramme
•	 Emission reporting pro-
gramme
•	 Emission Reduction 
programme
Activity which impacts 
emissions of one of the KP 
gases
•	 Energy efficiency pro-
gramme
•	 Emission reporting pro-
gramme
•	 Emission Reduction 
programme
Activity which impacts 
emissions of one of the KP 
gases
•	 Energy efficiency pro-
gramme
•	 Emission reporting pro-
gramme
Emission Reduction pro-
gramme
Programme Over-
sight
Government Department
Using:
•	 national incentive pro-
gramme mechanisms
Multilateral Agreement
Using:
•	 national legislation of 
cooperating Parties
•	 National Accreditation 
Bodies
International Body
Using:
•	 International binding 
legislation 
•	 National Accreditation 
Bodies
Issuance and Com-
pliance Body
Government Body Government Body en-
dorsed by Parties’ signa-
tures to the Multilateral 
agreement
International Body; or
Government Body recog-
nized under International 
agreement 
Standards Domestic Standard Bilateral Standard ISO Standard or 
International recognised 
standard
Control Entity and 
Qualifications
First /second Party – staff 
qualifications determined 
defined by control entity
Third Party or government 
body
Third Party
Monitoring & Re-
porting (Programme 
Participant/Installa-
tion Level)
Available to participant only, 
but archived for possible 
inspection by programme 
oversight body
Available to oversight body 
and participant only
Publically Available
MRV Reporting 
(National Level)
Internally available for as-
sessment of implementa-
tion success only
Publically available on par-
ticipant basis (registry)
Internally available
Publically Available
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5. Developing  
country capacities for 
MRV implementation
national reporting and immediately underpin both 
supported and credited NAMAs 
M2: Good capacity, but still requiring capacity build-
ing to support international verification of sup-
ported and/or credited NAMAs 
M3: Limited capacity that require significant capacity 
building both for national MRV processes as well 
as international MRV
The different levels of readiness will have implica-
tions for determining which types of NAMAs are most 
feasible for a country. Advanced NAMA programmes 
and policies that tap into elaborate environmental 
legislation or well-established and efficient energy sec-
tor regulation will be most appropriate for countries in 
group M1, while countries in group M3 may benefit 
from more project based approaches that do not rely 
as much on well-functioning macro systems. Figure 
4 illustrates the probable weight of activities divided 
between policy NAMAs and specific project NAMAs as 
a function of the national capacity to administer MRV 
systems. To the left in the figure are M3 countries that 
adopt a project based approach with fewer strategic 
elements and a more immediate focus on implementa-
tion of projects with multiple benefits, including that of 
emissions reduction. In these countries policy options 
are relatively few and enforcement structures relatively 
weak. Instead, they might concentrate on activities 
which have obvious parallels to the CDM Programme of 
Activity (or stand-alone CDM projects) and thereby ben-
efit from existing MRV structures, methodologies, and/
or an existing service supplier network. If a supported 
NAMA structure, instead of a crediting model, is the 
basis for such project activities it may even employ a 
less stringent verification regime. In general, the project 
approach might be more appropriate in countries with 
less administrative capacity. 
To the right in Figure 4 are countries that focus more 
on policies, which will lend themselves to reporting by 
According to the final Bali decision (CP. 13, 2007), devel-
oping country Parties should take “Nationally appropriate 
mitigation actions ... in the context of sustainable devel-
opment, supported and enabled by technology, financ-
ing and capacity-building, in a measurable, reportable 
and verifiable manner.” While such mitigation actions 
may be MRV’able in theory, it may well fall beyond the 
means of host countries to carry out such MRV activi-
ties in practice as it depends both on the type of action 
and the level of administrative capacity of that particular 
Party. Hence, the Bali decision calls for capacity building. 
The Copenhagen Accord further specifies some impor-
tant aspects regarding MRV:
 » Mitigation actions by developing countries shall be 
communicated every two years via biennial update 
reports and through national communications every 
four years.
 » MRV of unilateral NAMAs will be conducted do-
mestically.
 » Supported NAMAs are subject to international MRV 
according to guidelines by the COP.
The Durban outcome is even more specific on the report-
ing requirements for developing countries through the Bi-
ennial Update Reports and the International Consultation.
As described earlier, the MRV systems and legal tradi-
tions differ between countries. Similarly, the implemen-
tation of the MRV frameworks will depend on NAMA 
types and which sectors of the economy they are tar-
geting. The capacities of developing countries to imple-
ment the MRV frameworks will also differ and in order 
to further discuss this implication, a theoretical division 
in three levels was established to distinguish the actual 
readiness and capacities of countries for MRV:
M1: Full capacity, i.e. national MRV systems in place 
(or to be put in place) that are sufficient for inter-
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proxies or qualitative process metrics and subsequent 
tracking of emissions reductions stemming from these 
initiatives. Inspiration for such MRV structures may 
be sought in current practices for budget support in 
general development assistance, where country driven 
approaches to monitoring and evaluation is gaining 
ground as a fundamental principle. While these prac-
tices may be stepping stones, they will not constitute 
fully fledged MRV systems for emissions reduction, but 
will at some point require a ‘translation system’ to con-
vert proxies into figures – at least ballpark figures – for 
achievements in terms of emissions reduction (refer-
ence is also made to the earlier discussion on bounda-
ries and the need for a common yardstick). This may 
also be relevant for countries finding themselves in cat-
egory M2 (centre of Figure 4), i.e. countries with some 
capacity and potential for both policy and project type 
NAMAs, but requiring funding for both. These countries 
are also likely to be recipients of development assis-
tance, and the MRV of NAMAs that have their origins 
in low emission development strategies and national 
planning frameworks may be mainstreamed into exist-
ing national systems for monitoring and evaluation of 
development assistance and results. Such mainstream-
ing requires that financing agreements for supported 
NAMAs are explicit about the measurement systems 
and targets agreed. Such clearness will require addi-
tional metrics related to emissions reduction, possibly 
inspired by the typology provided in chapter 4. Trans-
lation systems converting financial or other data into 
(estimates of) emissions reduction will be developed on 
a case-by-case basis – and in cases where bilateral do-
nors are involved also in collaboration with donors with 
the aim to specifically assess the contribution of policy 
based NAMAs to national emissions reductions.
To give an example: A typical A-F labeling requirement 
for household appliances, in this case air conditioners 
and refrigerators, is introduced in the hope that con-
sumers will prefer the more expensive and more energy 
efficient models. If data can be collected from retailers 
and baseline data can be retrieved (earlier distribution of 
sales on different models) then emissions reduction can 
be measured as the change in behavior and an assumed 
daily usage of the appliances. This would be a unilateral 
NAMA with no need for finance, assuming that the costs 
of labeling are borne by the manufacturers. If a donor 
now wishes to promote sales of more energy efficient 
appliances and offers to pay a subsidy for the efficient 
models, for instance through a reduction of import duty 
on those models (i.e. the donor pays the import duty for 
these models), then measurement of emissions reduc-
tion could be based on the import duty paid by the 
donor, as there would be a possible linkage between the 
labeling and the import duty replaced by the donor. 
This example easily lends itself to assessment of a 
given host country’s capacity to implement measure-
ment and reporting structures – in this particular sector, 
i.e. its ability to operate a measurement and reporting 
system for this particular appliances example does not 
mean that it would have similar competencies in any 
other sector. 
Development of domestic capacity for MRV of NAMAs 
requires institutional development, education, train-
ing and capacity development for relevant evaluation/
MRV units. All of these may either constitute separate 
(donor funded) activities or they may be considered as 
an integral element of a phased supported NAMA in an 
agreement between a funding party and a host country.
The categorization of countries in three groups (or more 
if desired) can be made by using proxies, e.g. indices, 
to determine the capacity and capabilities of a country. 
For instance, indices such as the Human Develop-
ment Index (HDI) or indices produced by Transparency 
International may give an indication of the institutional 
Figure 4: Capacity and capabilities of developing countries
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capacities of a country. A much more direct evalua-
tion, however, would specifically assess the capacities 
on the MRV elements discussed in this Primer. Such 
evaluations need not be authoritative or based on inter-
national standards, and may, at least initially, resemble 
a ‘self-assessment’ exercise that feeds into the LCDS 
and NAMA prioritization process.
The evaluations should also be sector specific. No coun-
try, developing or developed, has equally well developed 
MRV frameworks in all sectors. A country can therefore 
belong to all three categories at the same time, but in 
different sectors. The assessments may also be helpful 
in evaluating what types of NAMAs are more relevant in 
certain sectors compared to others or which sectors are 
more obvious targets for NAMAs than others.
Such discussions will ultimately have to link to the issue 
of financing. To the extent that NAMAs are proposed 
as unilateral initiatives, MRV requirements are now laid 
down in the Durban outcome as earlier described. 
These requirements, however, do not preclude additional 
criteria introduced by donors that engage in supported 
NAMAs. Consultations between a donor – bilateral or 
multilateral - and a possible NAMA host country may 
first consider reviewing a self-assessment that may have 
been performed by the host country in one or more sec-
tors of interest. Such a review could reveal which sectors 
would be more appealing in terms of attracting funding. 
It may, at a first glance, seem as if the initial MRV 
capacity determines the access to funding or the other 
way around, that it is not the country’s capacity, but its 
demand for funding which determines the various kinds 
of requirements for MRV. These are concerns that at 
the general level have also been raised in recent years 
in traditional development assistance, emphasizing a 
major shift towards country driven approaches.
The country driven approaches may, if not implemented 
carefully, represent a risk of ‘raising the bar’ in the sense 
that countries unable to meet the reporting or institution-
al requirements may have difficulties in accessing donor 
funding. A further challenge is that NAMAs that succeed 
on the basis of bilateral funding donors, while respect-
ing the country driven approach, may still have basic 
requirements that are not aligned. There is a risk of in-
voluntarily creating a patchwork of donors with preferred 
recipient countries, recipient countries meeting only a 
selection of donors’ criteria and even some countries 
potentially falling entirely through. It is therefore important 
to take proper steps to ensure a basic MRV structure. It 
is also for this reason that the project based approach 
must remain an option, as illustrated in Figure 4.
5 .1 Types of NAMAs, levels of capacity, and 
elements of an MRV system
As per definition, NAMAs are country driven. Standards for 
national appropriateness, including the appropriateness 
of formulation, cannot be centrally established and hence 
there cannot be a vigorous scrutiny of completeness of 
submissions. At most there can be guidance. As is already 
clear from current pledges under the Copenhagen Ac-
cord, there are immense differences in the approaches to 
adopting NAMAs. For the system to work, and particularly 
for the funding mechanisms to function, more details are 
probably necessary, but it will ultimately be the countries’ 
prerogative to decide the national appropriateness of the 
structure of, and the definition of, the NAMA. 
It is indeed possible that MRV systems related to such 
nationally determined actions will require less rigorous 
scrutiny of the actual performance of the implemented 
NAMA compared to current CDM routines. In negotia-
tions between the host country and the funding institu-
tions (for example: Green Climate Fund, multilateral, bi-
lateral or others), the performance and the performance 
indicators will probably have been agreed upon. The 
MRV capacities will equally be evaluated in this context. 
These elements are brought together in Figure 5 that 
places a given NAMA in a given country in a specific 
MRV context; drawing upon the MRV elements de-
scribed in Chapters 3 and 4. The assessment will need 
to be sector-wise, as countries do not have uniform 
capacities across sectors.
Figure 5 sets the NAMAs in the context of low carbon 
development strategies and divides them into the three 
categories defined earlier, i.e. unilateral, supported and 
credited NAMAs. Within each of these three categories 
the implementation required to achieve the minimum 
MRV requirements will differ depending on the capacity 
and capabilities of the country. The MRV requirements 
are met by introducing the missing MRV elements from 
the ‘toolbox’ on the left.
 
For instance, if a country has suggested a supported 
renewable energy NAMA, and has assessed itself as a 
‘category M2’ country in the energy sector, a potential 
donor and the NAMA host country would immediately 
be able to identify the relevant MRV elements to be 
included and the NAMA host country’s responsiveness 
on supplying these elements.
Implementation of unilateral NAMAs is believed to be 
within the existing capacities of respective line minis-
tries (otherwise they would be implemented with inter-
national support). Performance will be measured and 
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probably reported as part of annual reporting processes 
already on-going for other activities and projects. Thus, 
existing reporting structures will be employed. 
Internationally supported NAMAs will require the most 
elaborated institutional structuring and will probably bene-
fit from incorporating already existing modalities and pro-
cedures from administration of development assistance. 
In many cases, this will involve the Ministry of Finance 
which will keep track of funds available from international 
sources and the disbursement against purposes agreed, 
but agreements may also be directly with line ministries. 
A key challenge is to link assistance provided to actual 
implementation of emissions reduction activities. 
Countries have differing abilities and capacities for 
establishing institutions necessary to perform the above 
verification and reporting tasks. It is, however, more a 
question of performing the task than putting the institu-
tional structures in place, as no additional institutional 
structures are formally required. That said, emissions 
reporting may not be a mainstream administrative task 
in most of the ministries that are potentially relevant 
for overseeing projects and policies related to emis-
sions reduction. Capacity building is needed, and may 
be provided separately or as part of specific NAMAs. 
Financial reporting on the other hand may be more 
straightforward, carried out by the Ministry of Finance, 
which in many cases will have experience in administer-
ing development assistance. 
It must be expected that few developing countries have 
sufficient resources and systems to provide the neces-
sary reporting. Capacity shortfalls will have to be ad-
dressed by accommodating external assistance within 
these existing administrative structures, which may 
partially serve to help build capacity in order to estab-
lish such rigorous routines and capabilities. In the short 
term, it may be necessary to ensure the actual report-
ing with the provision of full-time technical assistance. 
Such assistance could reduce differences in the quality 
of reporting among countries (and sectors) and thus 
avoid the risk of exacerbating already existing biases in 
financial flows from developed to developing countries.
Figure 5: MRV elements and minimum requirements
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6 .The way forward  
in designing a rigorous 
MRV system
Establishing guidelines for MRV systems intended to 
support the implementation of Nationally Appropriate 
Mitigation Actions, the official definition of which still 
remains outstanding, is not straightforward. Elaborating 
pathways to take us from the current situation to one 
with well-established NAMAs and MRV systems is even 
more challenging. The overarching principle of national 
appropriateness, however, is probably the guiding light 
by which each country will find their way, not following 
a top-down prescriptive approach, but determining first 
the national appropriateness of mitigation actions, the 
means of implementation and finally the way in which 
MRV systems can be devised that provide evidence of 
performance in a sufficiently rigorous manner. It also 
follows from this that it is not the MRV options that 
determine the feasibility of a NAMA, but the feasibility of 
the NAMA that determines the possible MRV structure. 
There will probably be no two countries that follow 
the same pathway. The challenge here is that not all 
pathways are equally long. Some will take the highway, 
and some may use a longer and winding road, thus 
obviously not reaching the point of ‘readiness for imple-
mentation’ at the same time. This could jeopardize the 
emissions reduction objectives as the obvious reduc-
tion options maybe missed or delayed. More important-
ly, it could jeopardize the equal access to funding. 
To partly mitigate this, the ‘nationally appropriate path-
ways’ could be guided by the setting of milestones at 
the international level. While the timing should be fixed 
at a global level, the milestones should not be norma-
tive. Rather they should define the level of progress 
towards an end goal, which is derived from the elabora-
tion of a Low Carbon Development Strategy (LCDS). 
The setting of milestones might also be helpful in de-
termining the need for capacity building, and thus also 
the prioritization of efforts to build this capacity. Follow-
ing the principles outlined in this Primer, this may also 
include filling in the temporary capacity gaps through 
the provision of external assistance to ensure that the 
differences in ‘arrival times’ at the point of readiness is 
reduced to a minimum.
Thus, it is obvious that the pathways for MRV can-
not be seen in isolation. It is integrated with the entire 
process of establishing national LCDSs and NAMAs 
and probably only becomes relevant in the end phases 
of the process, reflecting the above indication of a 
‘NAMAs first principle’. Nevertheless, only informed ex-
changes will take the process forward, and it is hoped 
that this first MRV Primer is inspirational, especially for 
understanding what will need to be measured, re-
ported and verified in a future climate regime to ensure 
the continued concerted effort in combating climate 
change.
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Annex 1
The table below shows how the metrics detailed in 
Chapter 4 might be applied to different types of NA-
MAs. Time series of data would equally be important, 
though these naturally will have to be accumulated 
Examples of metrics for different types of NAMAs
Example 
NAMA
Quantitative 
 Financial metrics
Quantitative 
 Process metrics
Quantitative Technical 
metrics
Qualitative 
 metrics
Capac-
ity building 
NAMA
•	 Donor investment 
and recipient 
fund allocation for 
capacity building
•	 Establishment of 
data and record 
keeping systems 
at national level
•	 Quality of data 
system
Building 
energy ef-
ficiency
•	 Donor investment 
and recipient 
fund allocation 
for retrofitting of 
buildings
•	 Cost of retrofit-
ting office build-
ings per square 
metre
•	 Number of build-
ings with energy 
management 
systems imple-
mented
•	 Number of 
energy efficient 
devices installed
•	 Reduction in energy 
use in buildings with an 
implemented energy 
management system
•	 Recording the “power” 
of the device installed (as 
per CDM methodology)
•	 Metering the “energy 
use” of an appropriate 
sample of the devices 
installed (as per CDM 
methodology)
•	 Assessment 
of behaviour-
based energy 
management 
outcomes fol-
lowing training
Sectoral 
emissions 
reductions 
programme
•	 Donor investment 
and recipient 
fund allocation 
for technology 
diffusion
•	 Establishment of 
sectoral inventory 
including baseline 
and  reporting 
systems  
•	 Estimated reduced avoid-
ed emissions (t-CO2 eq) 
at the facility level
•	 Estimated reduced avoid-
ed emissions (t-CO2 eq) 
at the sector level
•	 Quality of secto-
ral inventory in-
cluding baseline 
and  reporting 
systems 
over time for those types of data that are currently not 
recorded or collected. Collected data would naturally 
feed into the Biennial Update Reporting (BUR) routines 
to be established.
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